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Creating a loyal customer base is one of the most important,
and at the same time, most difficult tasks a company faces. Creating
loyalty online (e-loyalty) is especially difficult since customers can
“switch” to a competitor with the click of a mouse. In this paper
we investigate e-loyalty in online auctions. Using a unique data set
of over 30,000 auctions from one of the main consumer-to-consumer
online auction houses, we propose a novel measure of e-loyalty via the
associated network of transactions between bidders and sellers. Using
a bipartite network of bidder and seller nodes, two nodes are linked
when a bidder purchases from a seller and the number of repeat-
purchases determines the strength of that link. We employ ideas from
functional principal component analysis to derive, from this network,
the loyalty distribution which measures the perceived loyalty of every
individual seller, and associated loyalty scores which summarize this
distribution in a parsimonious way. We then investigate the effect of
loyalty on the outcome of an auction. In doing so, we are confronted
with several statistical challenges in that standard statistical models
lead to a misrepresentation of the data and a violation of the model
assumptions. The reason is that loyalty networks result in an extreme
clustering of the data, with few high-volume sellers accounting for
most of the individual transactions. We investigate several remedies
to the clustering problem and conclude that loyalty networks consist
of very distinct segments that can best be understood individually.
1. Introduction. Online auctions are becoming an increasingly impor-
tant component of consumers’ shopping experience. On eBay, for instance,
several million items are offered for sale every day. What makes online auc-
tions popular forms of commerce is their availability of almost any kind of
item, whether it be new or used, and their constant accessibility at any time
of the day, from any geographical region in the world. Moreover, the auction
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mechanism often engages participants in a competitive environment and can
result in advantages for both the buyers and the sellers [Bajari and Hortacsu
(2004)].
In this paper we study online auctions from the point of view of the
bidder–seller network that they induce. Every time a bidder purchases from
a seller, both bidder and seller are linked. Buying from a seller indicates
that the bidder likes the product and trusts the seller—thus, it establishes
a relationship between bidder and seller. Many sellers list more than one
auction (i.e., they sell multiple items across different auctions), so repeat
transactions by the same bidder across different auctions of the same seller
measure the strength of this relationship, that is, it measures the strength
of a bidder’s loyalty to a particular seller.
Studying loyalty in auction networks is new. Much of the existing auction
literature focuses on only the seller and the level of trust she signals to the
bidders [e.g., Brown and Morgan (2006)]. To that end, a seller’s feedback
score (i.e., the number of positive ratings minus the number of negative
ratings) is often scrutinized [e.g., Lingfang (2006)] and it has been shown
that higher feedback scores can lead to price-premiums for the seller [see
Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007); Livingston (2005)]. In this paper we study a
complementary determinant of a bidder’s decision process: loyalty. Loyalty is
different from trust. Trust is often associated with reliability or honesty; and
trust may be a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for loyalty. Loyalty,
however, is a stronger determinant of a bidder’s decision process than trust.
Loyalty refers to a state of being faithful or committed. Loyalty incorporates
not only the level of confidence in the outcome of the transaction, but also
satisfaction with the product, the price, and also with previous transactions
by the same seller. Moreover, loyal bidders are often willing to make an
emotional investment or even a small sacrifice to strengthen a relationship.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on online auctions:
First, we propose a novel way tomeasure e-loyalty from the bipartite network
of bidders and sellers; then, we investigate the effect of e-loyalty on the
outcome of an auction and the statistical challenges associated with it.
More specifically, our goal is to understand and learn from loyalty net-
works. To that end, we first measure a seller’s perceived loyalty by its induced
bidder loyalty distribution. Then, borrowing ideas from functional data anal-
ysis, we capture key elements of that distribution using functional principal
component analysis. The resulting principal component scores capture dif-
ferent aspects of loyalty-strength, -skew and -variability. We then investigate
the impact of these loyalty scores on the outcome of an auction such as its
final price.
We would like to point out that the goal of this paper is not to develop
new auction theory (i.e., it is not our goal to develop a game-theoretic model
under market equilibrium considerations). Rather, our goal is to mine a rich
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set of auction data for new patterns and knowledge. In that sense, our work
is exploratory rather than confirmatory. However, as it is often the case with
exploratory work, we hope that our work will also inspire the development of
new theory. In particular, we hope that our work will bring the attention to
the many statistical challenges associated with the study of online markets.
Studying e-loyalty networks is challenging from a statistical point of view
because of the asymmetric nature of the network. Just as in many offline
markets, online auctions are dominated by few very large sellers (“Megasellers”).
Megasellers have a large supply of products and thus account for a large
number of all the transactions. Statistically, this dominance results in a
clustering of the data and, as a result, a violation of standard OLS model
assumptions. In this paper we investigate several remedies to this clustering
effect via random effects models and weighted least squares. However, our
investigation shows that neither approach fully eases all problems. We thus
conclude that the data is too segmented to be captured by a single model
and compare our analyses with the results of a data-clustering approach.
This paper has implications for future research in online markets. Many
online markets are characterized by a few large “players” that dominate most
of the interactions and many, many small players with occasional interac-
tions. This is often referred to as the “long tail effect” in online markets [see,
e.g., Bailey et al. (2008)]. For instance, on eBay, Megasellers dominate the
marketplace. The statistical implication is that repeat interactions by these
Megasellers are no longer independent and, hence, the assumptions of OLS
break down. While this may not always create a problem, this research shows
that, first, the conclusions from an OLS regression are significantly different
from models that account for the clustering induced by Megasellers, and,
second, that it is not at all obvious how to best account for this clustering.
In particular, this research puts the spotlight on the findings from previous
researchers [e.g., Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007); Ba and Pavlou (2002); Bapna,
Jank and Shmueli (2008)] who, despite similar data-scenarios, rely their con-
clusions on the OLS modeling assumptions. [See also Bajari and Hortacsu
(2004) who, in the context of trust and online auctions alone, count over 6
papers relying on OLS modeling techniques.]
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our data and
we motivate the existence of auction networks. In Section 3 we use seller–
bidder networks to derive several key measures of e-loyalty. We investigate
the effect of e-loyalty on the outcome of an auction in Section 4 and explore
different modeling alternatives. The paper concludes with final remarks in
Section 5.
2. Auction networks. In this section we describe the data for our study.
We start by describing the online auction mechanism in general and our
data in particular. Then, we motivate the network structure induced by the
auction mechanism and show several snapshots of our network data.
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Table 1
Auctions and products
Attribute Mean Median St. dev
Auction duration (Days) 3.50 3.00 4.43
Starting price (USD) 3.77 3.33 5.64
Closing price (USD) 6.61 4.25 9.15
Item quantity 5.42 1.00 129.47
Bid count 3.16 1.00 4.26
Size (bead diameter) 6.41 6.00 3.35
Pieces (# of beads per item) 124.30 48.00 343.79
2.1. Online auction data. In online auctions participants bid for prod-
ucts or services over the Internet. While there are different types of auction
mechanisms, one of the most popular types (a variant of which can also be
found on eBay.com) is the Vickrey auction, in which the initial price starts
low and is bid up successively. Online auctions have experienced a tremen-
dous popularity recently, which can be attributed to several features: Since
the auction happens online, it is not bound by any temporal or geographical
constraints, in stark contrast to its brick-and-mortar counterpart (e.g., at
Sotheby’s). It also fosters social interactions since it engages participants in
a competition. As a result, it attracts a large number of buyers and sellers
which offers advantages for both sides: sellers find a large number of poten-
tial customers which often results in higher prices and lower costs. On the
other hand, buyers find a large variety of products which enables them to
locate rare products and to choose between products with the lowest price.
One of the most well-known online auctions is eBay, but there are many
more (e.g., uBid, Prosper, Swoopo or Overstock), each of which offers a va-
riety of different products and services. The data for this research originates
from eBay online auctions and we describe details of the data next.
We study the complete bidding records of Swarovski fine beads for every
single auction that was listed on eBay between April, 2007, and January,
2008. (Note that the data were obtained directly from eBay so we have a
complete set of bidding records for that time frame.) Our data contains
Table 2
Sellers
Attribute Mean Median St. dev
Volume 163.90 6.00 999.00
Conversion rate 0.67 0.67 0.33
Seller feedback 2054.00 264.00 12,400.00
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Table 3
Buyers
Attribute Mean Median St. dev
Volume 3.62 1.00 14.29
Item quantity 5.05 2.00 29.25
Bidder feedback 228.10 70.00 559.53
a total of 36,728 auctions out of which 25,314 transacted. There are 365
unique sellers and 40,084 bidders out of which 19,462 made more than a
single purchase. Each bidding record contains information on the auction
format, the seller, the bidder, as well as on product details. Tables 1–3
summarize this information.
Table 1 shows information about the auctions and the product sold in
each auction. We can see that the typical auction-length is 3 days.1 The
product sold in each auction (packages of beads for crafts and artisanship)
is of relatively small value and, thus, both the average starting and closing
prices are low. While many eBay auctions sell only one item at a time (e.g.,
laptop or automobile auctions), auctions in the crafts category often feature
multi-unit auctions, that is, the seller offers multiple counts of the same item
and bidders can decide how many of these items they wish to purchase. In
our data the average item-quantity per auction is 5.42. Auctions thrive under
competition among bidders and while the average number of bids is slightly
larger than 3, the median is only 1. As pointed out above, the items sold
in these auctions are packages of Swarovski beads. The value of a bead is,
in part, defined by its size, and the average diameter of our beads equals
6.41 millimeters. Another measure for the value of an item is the number of
pieces per package; we can see that there are on average over 124 beads in
each package, but this number varies significantly from auction to auction.
We are primarily interested in the bipartite network between bidders and
sellers. One main factor influencing this network is the size of the seller. We
can see (Table 2) that the average seller-volume (i.e., number of auctions
per seller) is over 163. A seller’s auction will only transact if (at least one)
bidder places a bid. While low transaction rates (or “conversion rates”) are
a problem for many eBay categories (e.g., automobiles), in our data the
average conversion rate is 67% per seller, which is considerably high. One
factor driving conversion rates is a seller’s perceived level of trust. Trust
is often measured using a seller’s feedback rating computed as the sum of
positive (“+”) and negative (“−”) ratings. Trust averages over 2000 in our
data.
1We excluded fixed-price listings (“Buy-It-Now”) since these do not constitute true
auction mechanisms.
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Table 3 shows the corresponding attributes of the bidders. Bidders win on
average almost 4 auctions (“volume”) and, in every auction, they purchase
on average over 5 items. (Recall the multi-unit auctions with several items
per listing.) The bidder feedback [computed as the sum of positive (“+”) and
negative (“−”) feedback] captures a bidder’s experience with the auction-
process and its average is over 220 in our data, signaling highly experienced
bidders.
2.2. Bidder–seller networks. Interactions in an online auction result in a
network linking its participants. Bidders bidding on one auction are linked to
other bidders who bid on the same auction. Sellers selling a certain product
are linked to other sellers selling the same product. In this study we focus
on the network between buyers and sellers. Each time a bidder transacts
with a particular seller, both are linked.2 A seller can set up more than one
auction, thus, repeat transactions (i.e., purchases) measure the strength of
this link. For instance, a bidder transacting 10 times with the same seller
has a stronger link compared to a bidder who transacts only twice. In our
analyses, we only consider edges with link-strength of at least 4. That is,
we disregard all bidder–seller transactions with frequency less than 4. While
there exists no recommended or ideal cut-off, our investigations suggest that
results vary for smaller values but stabilize for link-strengths of 4 and higher.
In that sense, the network strength measures an important aspect about the
relationship between buyers and sellers: customer loyalty.
We would like to emphasize that one can measure loyalty in different
ways. While one could count all the repeat bids a bidder places on auctions
hosted by the same seller, we only count the number of winning bids (i.e.,
the number of transactions). While both bids and winning bids indicate
a relationship between buyers and sellers, a winning bid signals a much
stronger commitment and is thus much more indicative of a buyer’s loyalty.
In this paper we investigate loyalty relationships across auctions. Studying
cross-auction relationships is rather rare in the literature on online auctions,
and it has gained momentum only recently [Haruvy et al. (2008); Reddy and
Dass (2006); Jank and Shmueli (2007); Jank and Zhang (2008)]. In this work
we consider network effects between auction participants and their impact
on the outcome of an auction.
Consider Figure 1 which shows the top 10% of high volume sellers. Sellers
are marked by white triangles, bidders are marked by red squares. A (black)
line between a seller and bidder denotes a transaction. The width of the
line is proportional to the number of transactions and hence measures the
2Note that in our data, bidders and sellers form disjoint groups, that is, a node is either
a bidder-node or a seller-node, but not both. Thus, our network forms a bipartite network.
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Fig. 1. Network of the top 10th percentile of sellers: the top 10% of sellers hosting the
most auctions.
strength of a link. We can see that some sellers interact with several hundred
different bidders (with 895, on average); we can also see that some sellers
are “exclusive” in the sense that they are the only ones that transact with
a set of bidders (see, e.g., at the margins of the network), while other sellers
“share” are a common set of bidders. Serving bidders exclusively vs. sharing
them with other sellers has huge implications on the outcome of the auction.
Figure 2 shows another subset of the data. In this figure we display only
the top 10% of all bidders with the highest number of transactions. We can
see that many of these high-volume bidders transact with only one seller
(note the many the red triangles which are connected with only a single arc
to the network) and are hence very loyal to the same person. Figure 3 shows
only new buyers (i.e., bidders who won an auction for the first time). This
network exemplifies the market share of a seller with the effect of repeat
buyers removed. We can see that the market is dominated by few mega
sellers, yet smaller sellers still attract some of the buyers. We can identify
5 mega-sellers, 3 high-volume sellers, and many medium- and low-volume
sellers. Since these are only first-time buyers, loyalty does not yet play a
role in bidders’ decisions. However, the fact that most first-time bidders
“converge” to only a few mega-sellers suggests that this is a very difficult
market for low-volume sellers to enter.
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Fig. 2. Network of the top 10th percentile of bidders: the top 10% of bidders bidding on
most auctions.
As pointed out above, bidder–seller networks capture loyalty of partici-
pants. While most sellers and bidders are linked to one another, here we
only focus on the sub-graphs created by each bidder–seller pair. Next, we
describe an innovative way to extract loyalty measures from these graphs.
3. Extracting loyalty from network information. Our loyalty measures
map the entire network of bidders and sellers into a few seller-specific num-
bers. For each seller, these numbers capture both the proportion of bidders
loyal to that seller, as well as the degree of loyalty of each bidder. We de-
rive the measure in two steps. First, we derive, for each seller, the loyalty
distribution; then, we summarize that distribution in a few numbers using
functional principal component analysis. We describe each step in detail
below.
Note that there exists more than one way for extracting loyalty informa-
tion from network data. We chose the route of loyalty distributions since
they capture the two most important elements of loyalty: the proportion of
customers loyal to one’s business, and the degree of their loyalty. Notice, in
particular, that we do not try to dichotomize loyalty (i.e., categorize it into
loyal vs. disloyal buyers): Since we do not believe that loyalty can be turned
on or off arbitrarily, we allow it to range on a continuous scale between 0
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Fig. 3. Network of new bidders: Bidders who bid for the very first time.
and 1. This will allow us to quantify the impact of the shape of a seller’s
loyalty distribution on his or her bottom line. For instance, it will allow us
to answer whether sellers with pure loyalty (i.e., all buyers 100% loyal) are
better off compared to sellers with more variation among their customer
base.
We would also like to caution that the resulting analysis is complex since
we first have to characterize the infinite-dimensional loyalty distributions
in a finite way, and subsequently interpret the resulting characterizations.
The resulting interpretations are more complex than, say, employing user-
defined measures of loyalty (e.g., summary statistics such as the number
of loyal buyers or the proportion of at least 70% loyal buyers). While such
user-defined measures are easy to interpret, there is no guarantee that they
capture all of the relevant information. (For instance, measuring the “num-
ber of loyal bidders” would first require us to define a cutoff at which we
consider one buyer to be loyal and another one to be disloyal—any such cut-
off is necessarily arbitrary and would lead to a dichotomization which we are
trying to avoid.) Rather than employing arbitrary, user-defined measures,
we set out to let the data speak freely and first look for ways to summarize
the information captured in the loyalty distributions in the most exhaustive
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way. This will lead us to the notion of principal component loyalty scores
and their interpretations. We will elaborate on both aspects below.
3.1. From loyalty networks to loyalty distributions. Consider the hypo-
thetical seller–bidder network in Figure 4. In that network, we have 4 sellers
(labeled “A,” “B,” “C” and “D”) and 10 bidders (labeled 1–10). An arc
between a seller–bidder pair denotes an interaction, and the width of the
arc is proportional to the number of repeat-interactions between the pair.
Consider bidder 1 who has a total of 10 interactions, all of which are with
seller A; we can say that bidder 1 is 100% loyal to seller A. This is similar for
bidders 2 and 3, who have a total of 8 and 6 interactions, respectively, all of
which are, again, with seller A. In contrast, bidders 4 and 5 are only 80% and
70% loyal to seller A since, out of their total number of interactions (both
10), they share 2 with seller B and 3 with seller C, respectively. All-in-all,
seller A attracts mostly highly loyal bidders. This is different for seller D
who attracts mostly little loyal bidders, as he shares all of his bidders with
either seller B or C.
For each seller, we can summarize the proportion of loyal bidders and
the degree of their loyalty in the associated loyalty distribution. The loyalty
distributions for sellers A–D are displayed in the right panel of Figure 4.
The x-axis denotes the degree of loyalty (e.g., 100% or 80% loyal), and
the y-axis denotes the corresponding density. We can see that the shape of
all four distributions is very different; while seller A’s distribution is very
left-skewed (mostly high-loyal bidders), seller D’s distribution is very right-
skewed (mostly little-loyal bidders). The distributions of sellers B and C fall
somewhat in between, yet they are still very distinct from one another.
Note that our definition of loyalty is similar to the concept of in- and
out-degree analysis. More precisely, we first measure the proportion of in-
teractions for each buyer (i.e., the normalized distribution of out-degree).
Then, we measure the perceived loyalty of each seller, which can be viewed
as the distribution of the weighted in-degree. This definition of loyalty is
very similar to the concept of brand-switching in marketing. In essence, if
we have a fixed number of brands (sellers in our case) and a pool of buyers
(i.e., bidders), then we measure the switching-behavior from one brand to
another.
While the loyalty distributions in Figure 4 capture all of the relevant
information, we cannot use them for further analysis (especially modeling).
Thus, our next step is to characterize each loyalty distribution by only a
few numbers. To that end, we employ a very flexible dimension reduction
approach via functional data analysis.
3.2. From loyalty distributions to loyalty measures. In order to investi-
gate the effect of loyalty on the outcome of an auction, we first need to
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) Shows a hypothetical network between 4 sellers (A–D, white triangles) and 10
bidders (1–10, red squares). The size of the arc between a seller and a bidder corresponds
to the number of interactions between the two. (b) Shows the resulting loyalty distributions
for each seller (i.e., it shows the relative frequencies).
characterize a seller’s loyalty distribution. While one could characterize the
distributions via summary statistics (e.g., mean, median or mode), Figure
4 suggests that loyalty is too heterogeneous and too dispersed. Therefore,
we resort to a very flexible alternative via functional data analysis [Ramsay
and Silverman (2005)].
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By functional data we mean a collection of continuous functional objects
such as curves, shapes or images. Examples include measurements of individ-
uals’ behavior over time, digitized 2- or 3-dimensional images of the brain,
or recordings of 3- or even 4-dimensional movements of objects traveling
through space and time. In our application, we regard each seller’s loyalty
distribution as a functional observation. We capture similarities (and dif-
ferences) across distributions via functional principal component analysis
(fPCA), a functional version of principal component analysis [see Kneip and
Utikal (2001)]. In fact, while Kneip and Utikal (2001) operate on the true
probability distributions, these are not known in our case; hence, we apply
fPCA to the observed (empirical) distribution function, which may introduce
an extra level of estimation error.
Functional principal component analysis is similar in nature to ordinary
PCA; however, rather than operating on data-vectors, it operates on func-
tional objects. In our context, we take the observed loyalty distributions
[i.e., the histograms Figure 4(b)] as input. While one could also first smooth
the observed histograms, we decided against it since the results were not
substantially different.
Ordinary PCA operates on a set of data-vectors, say, x1, . . . ,xn, where
each observation is a p-dimensional data-vector xi = (xi1, . . . , xip)
T. The goal
of ordinary PCA is to find a projection of x1, . . . ,xn into a new space which
maximizes the variance along each component of the new space and at the
same time renders the individual components of the new space orthogonal
to one another. In other words, the goal of ordinary PCA is to find a PC
vector e1 = (e11, . . . , e1p)
T for which the principal component scores (PCS)
Si1 =
∑
j
e1jxij = e
T
1 xi(1)
maximize
∑
iS
2
i1 subject to ∑
j
e21j = ‖e1‖
2 = 1.(2)
This yields the first PC, e1. In the next step we compute the second PC,
e2 = (e21, . . . , e2p)
T, for which, similarly to above, the principal component
scores Si2 = e
T
2 xi maximize
∑
iS
2
i2 subject to ‖e2‖
2 = 1 and the additional
constraint ∑
j
e2je1j = e
T
2 e1 = 0.(3)
This second constraint ensures that the resulting principal components are
orthogonal. This process is repeated for the remaining PC, e3, . . . ,ep.
The functional version of PCA is similar in nature, except that we now
operate on a set of continuous curves rather than discrete vectors. As a
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consequence, summation is replaced by integration. More specifically, assume
that we have a set of curves x1(s), . . . ,xn(s), each measured on a continuous
scale indexed by s. The goal is now to find a corresponding set of PC curves,
ei(s), that, as previously, maximize the variance along each component and
are orthogonal to one another. In other words, we first find the PC function,
e1(s), whose PCS
Si1 =
∫
e1(s)xi(s)ds(4)
maximize
∑
iS
2
i1 subject to∫
e21 ds= ‖e1‖
2 = 1.(5)
Similarly to the discrete case, the next step involves finding e2 for which
the PCS Si2 =
∫
e2(s)xi(s)ds maximize
∑
i S
2
i2 subject to ‖e2‖
2 = 1 and the
additional constraint ∫
e2(s)e1(s)ds= 0.(6)
In practice, the integrals in (4)–(6) are approximated either by sampling
the predictors, xi(s), on a fine grid or, alternatively, by finding a lower-
dimensional expression for the PC functions ei(s) with the help of a basis
expansion. For instance, let φ(s) = (φ1(s), . . . , φK(s)) be a suitable basis
expansion [Ramsay and Silverman (2005)], then we can write
ei(s) =
K∑
k=1
bikφk(s) =φ(s)
Tbi(7)
for a set of basis coefficients b= (bi1, . . . , biK). In that fashion, the integral
in, for example, (6) becomes∫
e2(s)e1(s)ds= b
T
1 Wb2,(8)
where W =
∫
φ(s)φ(s)T ds. For more details, see Ramsay and Silverman
(2005). In this work we use the grid-approach.
Common practice is to choose only those eigenvectors that correspond to
the largest eigenvalues, that is, those that explain most of the variation in
x1(s), . . . ,xn(s). By discarding those eigenvectors that explain no or only a
very small proportion of the variation, we capture the most important char-
acteristics of the observed data patterns without much loss of information.
In our context, the first 2 eigenvectors capture over 82% of the variation in
loyalty distributions.
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3.3. Interpreting the loyalty measures. Since our loyalty measures are
based on their principal component representations, interpretation has to
be done with care. Figure 5 shows the first 2 principal components (PCs).
The first PC (top panel) shows a growing trend and, in particular, it puts
large negative weight on the lowest loyalty scores (between 0 and 0.2) while
putting positive weight on medium to high loyalty scores (0.4 and higher).
Thus, we can say that the first PC contrasts the extremely disloyal dis-
tributions from the rest. Table 4 (first row) confirms this notion: Notice
the large negative correlation with the minimum; also, the large correlation
with the skewness indicates that PC1 truly captures extremes in the loyalty
distributions’ scores and shape. We can conclude that PC1 distinguishes
distributions of “pure disloyalty” from the rest.
The second PC has a different shape. The second PC puts most (positive)
weight on the highest loyalty scores (between 0.8 and 1); it puts negative
weight on scores at the medium and low scores (between 0.4 and 0.6) and
thus contrasts average loyalty from extremely high loyalty. Indeed, Table 4
(second row) shows that PC2 has a high positive correlation with the max-
imum and a high negative correlation with the median. In that sense, it
distinguishes the mediocre loyalty from the stars.
While the above interpretations help our understanding of the loyalty
components, their overall impact is still hard to grasp, especially because
every individual loyalty distribution will—by nature of the principal com-
ponent decomposition—comprise of a different mix between PC1 and PC2.
Fig. 5. First two principal component curves. The dashed line indicates the x-origin.
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Table 4
Correlation between the first two PC scores and
summary statistics of sellers’ loyalty distributions
Median SDev Max Min Skew
PC1 0.55 −0.2 0.52 −0.99 0.77
PC2 −0.78 −0.05 0.81 −0.02 0.63
Moreover, as we apply fPCA to observed densities (i.e., histograms), indi-
vidual values of each density function must be heavily correlated. This adds
additional constraints on the PCs and their interpretations. Hence, in the
following, we discuss five theoretical loyalty distributions and their corre-
sponding representation via PC1 and PC2.
Take a look at Figure 6. It shows five plausible loyalty distributions as they
may develop out of a bidder–seller network. We refer to these distributions
as “theoretic loyalty distributions” and we can characterize them by their
specific shapes. For instance, the first distribution is comprised of 100%
loyal buyers and we hence refer to it as “pure loyalty;” in contrast, the
last distribution is comprised of 100% disloyal buyers and we hence name
this distribution “pure disloyalty;” the distribution in the center (“somewhat
loyal”) is interesting since it is comprised mostly of buyers that exhibit some
loyalty but do not purchase exclusively from only one seller.
Table 5 shows the corresponding PC scores. We can see that the theo-
retical distribution corresponding to pure loyalty scores very high on PC1
since it is very right-skewed and does not have any values lower than 0.9;
in contrast, notice the PC1 scores for pure disloyalty : while it is the mirror
image of pure loyalty, it scores (in absolute terms) higher than the former
because it is not only very (left-) skewed, but its extremely small values
weigh heavily (and negatively) with the first part of the PC1-shape, which
is in contrast to the positive values of pure loyalty which do not receive as
much weight. As for PC2, Table 5 shows that pure loyalty scores even higher
Fig. 6. Five theoretic loyalty distributions.
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Table 5
PC1 and PC2 scores for the theoretical loyalty distributions from Figure 6
Pure lyty Strong lyty Somewhat loyal Two extremes Pure dislyty
PC1 0.56 0.47 0.32 −0.04 −0.64
PC2 0.72 0.51 −0.08 0.35 −0.01
on that component as its values are extremely large, much larger than the
typical (median) loyalty values. In contrast, pure disloyalty has very small
PC2 values, as low scores are given very little weight by PC2.
We can make similar observations for the remaining theoretical loyalty
distributions. For instance, the distribution of somewhat loyal scores high
on PC1 since it does not have many low values; but it also only receives an
average score on PC2 since it does not have many high values either. In the
following, we will use these theoretical loyalty distributions to shed more
light on the relationship between loyalty and the outcome of an auction.
4. Modeling e-loyalty. Our goal is to investigate the effect of loyalty on
the outcome of an auction. For instance, we would like to see whether sellers
who attract exclusively high-loyal bidders elicit price-premiums, or whether
more variability in buyers’ loyalty leads to a higher price. To that end, we
start out, in similar fashion to many previous studies on online auctions
[e.g., Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007)], with an ordinary least squares (OLS)
modeling framework. That is, we investigate a model of the form
y=Xβ+ ε,(9)
where X is a matrix of covariates and ε follows the standard linear model
assumptions. For the choice of the covariates, we are primarily interested in
the effect of loyalty on the price of an auction (i.e., the first 2 PC scores
from the previous section are our main interest). However, we also want to
control for factors other than loyalty which are also known to have an impact
on price; these factors include auction characteristics (auction duration),
item characteristics (item quantity, size and pieces), seller characteristics
(seller feedback, i.e., reputation and seller volume) and auction competition
(number of bids, i.e., bid-count).
We first investigate a standard OLS model that relates these covariates
to price. However, we will show that an OLS approach leads to violations
of the model assumptions. The reason lies in the asymmetry of the bidder–
seller network: the presence of high-volume sellers (i.e., seller nodes with
extremely high degree) biases the analysis and leads to wrong conclusions.
In particular, high-volume sellers have many repeat interactions which re-
sult in a strong clustering of the data and thus violate the i.i.d. assumption
E-LOYALTY NETWORKS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS 17
of OLS. We investigate several remedies to this problem. First, we investi-
gate two “standard” remedies via random effect (RE) models and weighted
least squares (WLS). Our results show that although both remedies ease
the problem, none removes it completely. We thus argue that the data is too
heterogeneous to be modeled within a single model and compare our results
with that of a data-segmentation strategy.
4.1. An initial model: OLS. Many studies employ an OLS modeling
framework to investigate phenomena in online auctions such as the effect
of the auction format, the impact of a seller’s reputation, or the amount of
competition [e.g., Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007); Ba and Pavlou (2002); Bapna,
Jank and Shmueli (2008)]. However, one problem with an OLS model ap-
proach is the presence of repeat observations on the same item. For instance,
if we want to study the effect of a seller’s reputation (measured by her feed-
back score), then repeat auctions by the same seller will severely overweight
the effect of high-volume sellers in the OLS model. This problem is typi-
cally not addressed in the online auction literature. We face a very similar
problem when modeling the effect of e-loyalty.
For illustration, take the OLS regression model in the top panel of Table
6. In this model we estimate the dependency of (log-)price on loyalty (mea-
sured by PC1 and PC2), controlling for all other factors described above.
Note that this model appears to fit the data very well (R-squared = 77%).
However, it is curious to see that seller feedback has a negative sign and
is statistically insignificant. This contradicts previous findings which found
that an increased level of trust leads to price premiums [Bajari and Hortacsu
(2004); Ba and Pavlou (2002); Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007)].
Figure 7 shows the residuals corresponding to the above model. The top
half shows the residuals plotted against seller-volume; the bottom half shows
the residual distribution. For each type of graph we present 4 different views:
one graph (left graphs in first and third panel) gives an overview; the other
graphs zoom in by seller volume (low, medium and high volume, respec-
tively). Notice that the residuals are rather skewed: a large proportion of
residuals are negative (see, e.g., top left graph), implying that our model
over-estimates price effects of loyalty. Moreover, we can also see that the
residual-variation increases for larger seller volumes. If we zoom in on both
the low-volume and medium-volume sellers, we can see that the true effect
of model misspecification is confounded with seller volume: while price ef-
fects of low-volume sellers are underestimated (note the positive-skew in the
residual distribution for low-volume sellers), the effects are overestimated
for medium-volume sellers (negative-skew); only high volume sellers appear
to be captured well by the model. Thus, the OLS regression model blends
low volume and medium volume sellers but represents neither of them ade-
quately.
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Table 6
Regression models on the entire (unsegmented) data set. The top panel shows the results
of OLS regression; the middle panel shows the random effects model, and the bottom
panel shows the weighted least squares model. The response is always log-price
Coefficient Estimate Std. error p-value
(Intercept) −1.64 0.06 0.00
Auction duration 0.02 0.00 0.00
log(item quantity + 1) −0.04 0.04 0.30
Bid count 0.06 0.00 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.42 0.00 0.00
Size 0.07 0.00 0.00
log(seller feedback + 1) −0.00 0.01 0.52
Loyalty-PC1 −0.17 0.05 0.00
Loyalty-PC2 −1.00 0.07 0.00
log(Volume) 0.16 0.01 0.00
AIC 15,148
R-squared 0.77
(Intercept) −0.58 0.22 0.00
Auction duration 0.01 0.00 0.00
log(item quantity + 1) −0.21 0.07 0.00
Bid count 0.05 0.00 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.27 0.00 0.00
Size 0.03 0.00 0.00
log(seller feedback + 1) 0.07 0.04 0.11
Loyalty-PC1 −0.40 0.22 0.07
Loyalty-PC2 −0.15 0.22 0.51
log(Volume) 0.05 0.04 0.20
AIC 8546
R-squared N/A
(Intercept) −1.59 0.12 0.00
Auction duration 0.01 0.00 0.01
log(item quantity + 1) 0.30 0.10 0.00
Bid count 0.08 0.00 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.26 0.01 0.00
Size 0.00 0.00 0.61
log(seller feedback + 1) −0.01 0.01 0.59
Loyalty-PC1 −1.00 0.08 0.00
Loyalty-PC2 1.33 0.11 0.00
log(Volume) 0.24 0.01 0.00
AIC 55,073
R-squared 0.43
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Fig. 7. Residuals of the OLS model.
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4.2. Two alternate models: WLS and RE. We have seen in the previ-
ous section that an OLS approach does not result in a model that can be
interpreted without concerns. We thus investigate two alternate models, a
random effects (RE) model and weighted least squares (WLS).
Random effects models are often employed when there are repeat obser-
vations on the same subject or when the data is clustered [e.g., Agresti et al.
(2000)]. Since we have many repeat auctions by the same seller, adding a
random, seller-specific effect to the model in (9) lends itself as a natural
remedy for OLS. While RE models have become popular only recently with
the advent of powerful computing and efficient algorithms,3 WLS has been
around for a longer time as a possible solution for heteroscedasticity [Greene
(2003)]. While the principle of WLS is powerful, it assumes that the matrix
of weights is known (or at least known up to a parameter value), which
reduces its practical value. In our context, we use weights that are inversely
proportional to the residual variance in each cluster. We will now compare
both approaches and see if they result in more plausible models for e-loyalty.
Table 6 (second and third panels) shows the results of the RE and WLS
models, respectively. We can see that WLS results in a very poor model
fit (both in terms of R-squared and AIC). While the RE model results in
much better model fit (compared to both the WLS and the OLS model),
it is curious that seller feedback is insignificant, similar to the OLS model
above. In fact, it is quite curious that none of the seller-related variables
(feedback, loyalty or volume) are significant in the RE model. This finding
suggests that none of the actions taken by the seller affect the outcome of an
auction, which contradicts both common practitioner knowledge as well as
previous research on the topic [Bajari and Hortacsu (2004); Ba and Pavlou
(2002); Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007)].
Figure 8 shows the residuals of the RE model. We can see that the mag-
nitude of the residuals has decreased, suggesting a better model fit. This is
expected as the random effects account for seller-specific variation due to
individual selling strategies (e.g., seller-specific auction parameters or prod-
uct descriptions), which all may lead to differences in final price. But we can
also see that the RE model still suffers from heteroscedasticity (much larger
residual variance for high volume sellers compared to low volume sellers).
Figure 9 shows the corresponding residuals of the WLS approach. While
we would have expected that WLS tames the heteroscedasticity somewhat,
it appears that model fit has become worse. (This is also supported by the
much poorer values of R-squared and AIC.) One possible reason is that
weights have to be chosen by the user (inversely proportional to seller vol-
ume, in our case), which may not result in the most appropriate weighting
of the data.
3Quite often, RE models have to be estimated using computationally intensive tech-
niques such as MCMC or other forms of stochastic estimation.
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Fig. 8. Residuals of the RE model.
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Fig. 9. Residuals of the WLS model.
E-LOYALTY NETWORKS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS 23
4.3. Data segmentation. None of the proposed modeling alternatives so
far have lead to models with reasonable residuals or economically defendable
conclusions. In fact, we have seen that the model fit differs systematically by
the seller volume. We take this as evidence that the data may be segmented
into different seller volume clusters. We have seen earlier (e.g., Figures 1
and 2) that sellers of different magnitude exhibit quite different effects on
bidders. We will thus now first cluster the data and then model each data-
segment separately.
We first cluster the data by seller volume (low, medium and high) and
then apply OLS regression within each segment, resulting in three different
regression models, one for each segment. We select the clusters with the ob-
jective of minimizing the residuals mean squared errors within each cluster.
This results in the following three segments: Low volume sellers—40 trans-
actions or less; medium volume sellers—40–350 transactions; high volume
sellers—more than 350 transactions.
Figure 10 shows the residuals of the resulting three models. We can see
that the model fit is much better compared to the previous modeling ap-
proaches. In each segment the magnitude of the residuals is very small,
all residuals scatter around the origin, and we also no longer find evidence
for heteroscedasticity in any of the three segments. In fact, the model fit
statistics (see Table 7) suggest that the segmentation approach leads to a
much better representation of the data compared to either OLS, RE or WLS
models.
Table 7 shows the parameter estimates for each segment. We can see
that the relationship between loyalty, trust and price varies from segment to
segment. In fact, while for the low volume sellers the significance of all seller-
related variables (feedback, loyalty or volume) is low, both feedback and
volume are much more significant than loyalty. (Note the much smaller p-
values of seller feedback and volume.) This suggests that while seller-related
actions may not play much of a role for low volume sellers (such as rookie
sellers and sellers that are new to the market), trust is much more important
compared to loyalty. This makes sense as low volume sellers have not much
of a chance to establish a loyal customer base due to the infrequency of their
transactions.
This is different for medium volume sellers. For medium volume sellers,
loyalty and volume are more significant than feedback. This suggests that
with increasing frequency of transactions, repeat transactions (i.e., loyalty)
have a more dominant effect on a seller’s bottom line. This effect is even more
pronounced for high volume sellers. This suggests that high volume sellers
are most affected by the actions of repeat customers. It is also interesting
that both feedback and loyalty are significant for high volume sellers. This
suggests that in the presence of two sellers with the same reputation, buyers
“act with memory” and return to repeat their previous shopping experience.
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Fig. 10. Residuals after data segmentation. The left panel shows the residuals of an
OLS model fitted only to the data from cluster 1 (low volume sellers); the middle and right
panels show the corresponding residuals for medium and high volume sellers.
In order to precisely quantify the effect of loyalty in each segment, con-
sider Table 8. In that table, we present, for each of the 5 theoretical loyalty
distributions from Figure 6, their corresponding combined effect on the re-
gression model. That is, we compute the combined effect of PC1 and PC2,
holding all other variables in the model constant.
We can see that in clusters 1 and 2, the effect of loyalty is considerably
small, consistent with the small (and insignificant) coefficients for low and
medium volume sellers in Table 7. For cluster 3, it is interesting that only
the distribution corresponding to somewhat loyal buyers results in a positive
price effect. In fact, we can see that extreme loyalty (i.e., the distributions
for both pure loyalty and pure disloyalty) has negative implications for a
seller’s bottom line. While the effect of disloyal bidders is easier to explain
(disloyal bidders may “shop around” more actively in the search for lower
prices and, as a result, drive down a seller’s revenue), the negative effect of
purely loyal bidders may be due to the fact that a bidder who exclusively
interacts with the same seller may form an opinion about that seller’s “going
price” which results in a less competitive auction process (and thus renders
the transaction into a fixed-price transaction). Thus, our results show that
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Table 7
Regression models on three data segments. The top panel shows the result
for the low volume sellers; middle panel shows medium volume sellers;
bottom panel shows high volume sellers. The response is always log-price
Coefficient Estimate Std. error p-value
(Intercept) −0.51 0.36 0.16
Auction duration 0.04 0.02 0.10
log(item quantity + 1) −0.06 0.10 0.50
Bid count 0.12 0.01 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.15 0.06 0.02
Size 0.06 0.03 0.05
log(seller feedback + 1) 0.08 0.04 0.07
Loyalty-PC1 −0.22 0.16 0.18
Loyalty-PC2 −0.03 0.13 0.82
log(Volume) −0.10 0.06 0.07
AIC 63
R-squared 0.76
(Intercept) −0.49 0.38 0.20
Auction duration −0.05 0.01 0.00
log(item quantity + 1) −0.11 0.19 0.58
Bid count 0.17 0.01 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.03 0.01 0.05
Size 0.01 0.01 0.58
log(seller feedback + 1) −0.01 0.02 0.65
Loyalty-PC1 −0.24 0.12 0.04
Loyalty-PC2 0.28 0.19 0.15
log(Volume) 0.33 0.08 0.00
AIC 534
R-squared 0.75
(Intercept) 1.68 0.10 0.00
Auction duration 0.02 0.00 0.00
log(item quantity + 1) −0.25 0.04 0.00
Bid count 0.05 0.00 0.00
log(Pieces) 0.39 0.00 0.00
Size 0.06 0.00 0.00
log(seller feedback + 1) 0.42 0.01 0.00
Loyalty-PC1 7.39 0.16 0.00
Loyalty-PC2 −9.41 0.17 0.00
log(Volume) −0.78 0.02 0.00
AIC 10,482
R-squared 0.83
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Table 8
Quantifying the effect of the 5 theoretic loyalty distributions from Figure 6
Pure lyty Strong lyty Somewhat loyal Two extremes Pure dislyty
Cluster 1 (low) −0.14 −0.12 −0.07 0.00 0.14
Cluster 2 (medium) 0.07 0.03 −0.10 0.11 0.15
Cluster 3 (high) −2.60 −1.29 3.14 −3.61 −4.62
the effect of loyalty is surprisingly “nonlinear” in that a mix of somewhat
loyal bidders results in the most competitive auction environment and thus
the highest price for the seller.
Another way of quantifying the impact of loyalty is via the difference
between pure loyalty and pure disloyalty. Notice that the difference in esti-
mated coefficients equals (−2.60 − 4.62) ≈ 2, which (as the response is on
the log-scale) implies that, all else equal, sellers with a purely loyal customer
base extract price premiums 200% higher compared to sellers with a purely
disloyal customer base.
5. Conclusion. In this paper we investigate loyalty of online transactions.
Loyalty is an important element to many business models, and it is espe-
cially difficult to manage in the online domain where consumers are offered
different choices that are often only a mouse-click away. We study loyalty
in online auctions. We derive online loyalty from the network of sellers and
bidders and find that while bidder’s loyalty can have a strong impact on the
outcome of an auction, the magnitude of its impact varies depending on the
size of the seller.
We want to point out that while we find that loyalty has a strong effect
on price, we do not determine the cause of loyalty. A buyer’s loyalty can
have many different causes such as a high-quality product, a speedy deliv-
ery, or an otherwise seamless service. While loyalty could also be caused
by price itself (i.e., a buyer returning to the same seller because of a low
price), it is unlikely in our setting due to the auction process. Recall that
in an auction the price is not fixed. Thus, a seller offering a top notch
product and an outstanding service will sooner or later see an increase
in bidders and, as a result, more competition and thus a higher price for
her product. Thus, loyalty is unlikely to be caused merely by bargain sell-
ers.
Also, we want to emphasize that while we find many repeat transactions
between the same seller–bidder pair in our data, the frequency of these repeat
interactions may depend on the type of product and the buyer’s demand for
this product. In our case (beads, i.e., arts and crafts), buyers have frequently
re-occurring demand for the same product and, hence, the chances that a
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buyer will seek out the same seller rise drastically. On the other hand, if
we were to consider the market for a product in which repeat transactions
are less common (such as computers, digital cameras, automobiles, etc.),
our loyalty networks would likely not be as dense. Nevertheless, it would be
equally important for sellers to understand what factors drive consumers to
spend money and we believe that loyalty networks are one way to address
that question.
There are several statistical challenges when studying loyalty networks.
First, deriving quality measures from the observed networks requires a method
that can capture both the intensity as well as the size of loyalty. We accom-
plish this using ideas from functional data analysis. Second, modeling the
effect of loyalty is complicated by the extreme skew of loyalty networks. Our
analysis shows that many different approaches can lead to model misspeci-
fication and, as a consequence, to economically wrong conclusions. Similar
problems likely exist in other studies on online markets (e.g., those that
study seller feedback or reputation where one also records repeat observa-
tions on the same seller). Our analysis leads us to conclude that the data
is too segmented to be treated by a single model and thus propose a data-
clustering approach.
Another statistical challenge revolves around sampling bidder–seller net-
works. As pointed out earlier, we have the complete set of bidding records
for a certain product (Swarovski beads, in this case) for a certain period of
time (6 months). As a result, we have the complete bidder–seller network for
this product, for this time frame. While sampling would be an alternative,
it would result in an incomplete network (since we would no longer observe
all nodes/arcs). As a result, we would no longer be able to compute loyalty
without error, which would bring up an interesting statistical problem. But
we caution that sampling would have to be done very carefully. While one
could, at least in theory, sample randomly across all different eBay cate-
gories, it would bring up several problems. The biggest problem is that we
would now be attempting to compare loyalty across different product types.
For instance, we would be comparing, say, a bidder’s loyalty for purchasing
beads (a very low price, low stake item) with that of purchasing digital cam-
eras, computers, or even automobiles (all of which are high price and high
stakes), which would be conceptually very questionable.
We also want to mention that we treat the bidder–seller network as static
over time. Our data spans a time-frame of only 6 months and we assume
that loyalty is static over this time-frame. This assumption is not too un-
realistic as many marketing models consider loyalty to be static over much
longer time frames [Fader and Hardie (2006); Fader, Hardie and Lee (2006);
Donkers, Verhoef and De Jong (2003)]. While incorporating a temporal
dimension (e.g., by using a network with a sliding window or via down-
weighting older interactions) would be an intriguing statistical challenge, it
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is not quite clear how to choose the width of the window or the size of the
weights. Moreover, we also explicitly tested for learning effects by buyers
over time and could not find any strong statistical evidence for it.
And finally, in this work we address one specific kind of network depen-
dence, namely, that between buyers and sellers. We argue that the lack of
independence among observations on the same sellers leads to a clustering-
effect and we investigate several remedies to this challenge. However, the de-
pendence structure may in fact be far more complex. As bidders are linked to
sellers which, in turn, are linked again to other bidders, the true dependence
structure among the observations may be far more complex. This may call
for innovative statistical methodology and we hope to have sparked some
new ideas with our work.
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